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This paper proposes a Social Security reform for the United States that gradually, but
ultimately fully, privatizes the system. This proposal follows the “no-harm, no-foul”
principle in that it preserves the benefits of older generations and yet promises the same or
higher retirement benefits for the young. As such it is both economically and politically
feasible.The paper demonstrates that the transition to a privatized system can be financed
without any additional taxation, including additional payroll taxation. Our approach is
likely to improve U.S. national saving and work incentives compared to the current
system. It also has advantages over other privatization proposals that recommend or may
require additional taxation to finance the transition. The paper points out, however, that
there is only a limited window of opportunity for implementing such a reform of the U.S.
Social Security system.Social Security Privatization: A Simple Proposal
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I. Introduction
The US Social Security system, now over 60 years old, has grown from a small
program designed to provide retirement security to a massive and complex system that
transfers resources between different demographic groups in the population.  Concern
about how to reform Social Security to meet future needs is likely to intensify as the oldest
of the baby-boom generations (those born during the mid-1940s through the mid-1960s)
begin to retire and collect their Social Security benefits in the year 2008--just 1 1 years
from now.  The strain of maintaining the existing system in the face of these demographics
has the potential to provoke significant conflict between the interests of the  young and the
old.  Indeed, viability of the current system will inevitably require either substantially
higher tax burdens on younger workers or reductions in the benefit levels of retirees.
Under current contribution and benefit rules, the program is expected to provide
today’s workers with rates of return that are much lower than the average returns
obtainable by investing in private capital markets. Even worse, projections of Social
Security finances under those same rules suggest that the system will enter financial
insolvency by the year 2012 (instead of by 2029 as officially recognized by the Social
Security Administration). The strategy of restoring the current system’s long-range
solvency by reducing benefits or by increasing worker contributions has several
drawbacks, not the least of which is a further deterioration in the returns for young
workers.
Our position in  this paper is that, under reasonable economic and demographic
assumptions, it may be possible to reform Social Security in a manner that avoids the stark
choice of abrogating promised benefits or escalating tax burdens, while at the same time3
placing the retirement of current and future generations on a sound economic foundation.
Like other advocates, we propose a reform that entails movement toward a mandatory
privatized retirement system. Unlike many others, however, our proposal follows the “no
harm, no foul,” principle:  The benefits of older generations are preserved while the young
obtain the same or better benefits (on average) by investing a major part of their  current
payroll contributions in private capital markets.
At its core, our proposal hinges on the fact that returns to private capital exceed
the growth rate of the wage-income tax base, which has been diminished by both slow
labor productivity growth and unfavorable demographic developments.  In essence, we
ask the following question:  Taking current rates of payroll contributions as given, is it
feasible to (a)  shift those below some specific age to a privatized system;  (b)  finance from
these contributions the  benefits promised to those over that age under the current system;
and  (c)  provide retirement resources to participants under the new system that are no
smaller than what they can reasonably expect under the  status quo?   Using a
straightforward generational accounting exercise based on official population projections
and reasonable assumptions about rates of return, we conclude that the answer to this
question is yes.
2
The approach we outline contains several desirable elements.  First, it  establishes a
“defined contribution” system for young generations, thus tightening the link between
contributions and benefits and thereby improving work incentives.  In addition, the plan
gradually eliminates the on-going intergenerational redistribution of resources, a major
                                                       
2 The method of generational accounting was jointly developed by Alan Auerbach, Laurence Kotlikoff,
and Jagadeesh Gokhale.  For a description of the general methodology, see Auerbach, Gokhale, and
Kotlikoff (1994).4
cause of the secular decline in US saving.  Furthermore,  economic theory  suggests that
the economic distortions of financing  the transition  to a privatized system  can be
minimized  if, after adjusting for rising incomes due to growth,  the burden of benefit
obligations to older generations is spread across all future generations via a proportional
(flat) tax.
3  Our plan incorporates this feature, thus reinforcing incentives for work, saving,
and investment.
Second, unlike other plans that may require additional non-payroll taxation to pay
off or service debt created during the transition to privatization, the foundation of our plan
is the current payroll-tax structure with  existing payroll tax rates.  Hence, it will not
introduce ancillary saving disincentives for individuals -- due to, for instance, additional
income taxation -- that can mitigate the beneficial macroeconomic effects of privatization.
In the broader context of fiscal reform more generally, this feature may be  particularly
important:  Recent research by Alesina and Perotti  (1996) indicates that  higher payroll
taxes (or personal income taxes more generally)  are typically associated with unsucces sful
reform efforts.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, our plan adheres to the requirements that
any reform proposal  be economically sustainable and politically feasible.  It is
economically sustainable because it provides for the retirement security of all future
generations.  It is politically feasible because it preserves the benefits of older generations
while offering the promise of the same or better retirement security for younger
generations.
                                                       
3 We make the usual assumption that non-distortionary lump-sum taxation is precluded.5
Following a general discussion of the trends and issues that motivate our proposal,
we present the basic plan in section III.  To preview those results, under our baseline
assumptions we calculate that an immediate implementation of a “no harm, no foul”
privatization scheme would involve shifting all workers below age 3 2 to a defined
contribution private pension plan with the following provisions:  (a) Workers shifted to the
privatized system forfeit all claims to accrued social security benefits ; (b)  Mandated total
“contributions” remain at existing levels; and (c)  Roughly 54 percent of the contributions
in the privatized system are dedicated to financing the acquired benefits of all those aged
32 and over (who remain in the existing system), with the balance allocated to an
approved private saving vehicle.
An important aspect of the calculations reported in this article is that a reform of
the nature we propose has a limited window of opportunity.  Specifically, as the retirement
date of the tail-end of the baby-boomers grows nearer, the tax burden on current and
future workers required to finance the benefits of retired cohorts  at current levels
increases, and the net return to those shifted to the privatized system is diminished.  In
fact, given our assumptions, the type of privatization we envision would not be technically
feasible beyond the year 2011.     The practical consequence of th is limited window of
opportunity is that the cut-off age noted above  becomes lower , and the necessary tax
portion of total contributions becomes larger , as the date of the plan’s implementation is
pushed further into the future.
A final note before proceeding:  Throughout we will focus our attention  solely on
the implied liabilities of the current system, and a plan to honor these obligations while
shifting to a mandatory privatized pension scheme.  Our proposal intentionally omits fiscal6
strategies for supporting current and prospective non-pension government expenditures
that are financed from surplus Social Security contributions.  We will return to this issue in
section IV.
II. The Current Status of the US Social Security System
A. How We Got Here...
The US Social Security program was created in 1935 during the aftermath of the
Great Depression.  Although motivated by the desire to provide assistance to the needy
elderly of the time, it was not established as a short-term welfare program.  Rather, its
founders’ objective was to create a long-lasting system for ensuring economic security
during retirement. The program was expanded in 1939 to provide survivor benefits to the
spouses and children of covered workers, and yet again in 1956 to provide disability
insurance. Hence, this program is also known as the Old Age and Survivors and Disability
Insurance Program (OASDI).
Eligibility to various benefits is acquired by paying money into the system when
working. Frequent rate hikes since the 1940s have increased the fraction of wages that
workers pay into the system.
4  Social Security benefits have also increased rapidly as a
result of far-reaching changes in both the scope and generosity of the system.  At its
inception, only workers  under age 65 in commerce and industry (except railroad
employees, agricultural, and domestic workers) were covered.  However, persistent
poverty among the elderly forced an abandonment of the “full reserve system:” In 1939,
Congress extended coverage to those  over age 65, thus firmly anchoring the system in a
                                                       
4Initially, the contribution rate was 2 percent applicable to wages up to $3,000, limiting the contribution
per worker to $60. Today, it exceeds 10.5 percent and is applicable to wages below $62,700. As a result,7
“pay-as-you-go” (PAYGO) framework involving intergenerational transfers.  Additional
extensions progressively brought an ever larger fraction of the population under
compulsory Social Security coverage. Moreover, the benefit formulae were amended on
several occasions to increase benefit payments.
5
B. The Economic Effects of Social Security
The successive broadening of Social Security’s coverage across additional
demographic groups has brought about a sizable (and on-going)  intragenerational transfer
of resources: Apart from old age insurance, the system provides protection against
widowhood, child and spousal dependency, divorce, and disability.  As a result, Social
Security treats married households and women more favorably than single individuals and
men respectively. Although this redistribution is motivated by social considerations, from
an economic standpoint, it breaks the link between the amount that different groups pay
into the system and the benefits that they receive from it.  Because of this, many workers
may be viewing Social Security payments as taxes rather than pension contributions meant
to secure their own retirement.  The Social Security payroll “tax” thus adds to marginal
income tax rates and worsens individual incentives to work.
Further, the expansion of PAYGO Social Security benefits (along with the growth
in health benefits via Medicare and Medicaid programs) occasions an on-going transfer of
resources across generations--from young and unborn generations toward older retirees.
Because older individuals consume a much larger fraction of their available lifetime
                                                                                                                                                                    
the average contribution per worker stood at $2,500 in 1994. This last figure is obtained by multiplying
the average wage for 1994 ($ 23,753) by the contribution rate applicable in that year (10.52 percent).
5 Coverage was extended to seamen and bank and loan-association employees in 1939, to farm workers,
domestic workers, and public workers not already covered under a government program in 1950, to the8
resources than young and unborn generations (the latter of whom have zero current
consumption), such  intergenerational resource transfers have been  identified by some as
the chief cause of the dramatic and secular decline in US national saving since the mid-
1970s.
6
 C. Long-Range Status: Judging Financial Solvency
Judging the long term financial prospects of Social Security is tricky business.
Taken at face value, official projections of the Social Security Administration suggest that
the system will remain financially solvent for another 33 years. Through 2018, the system
is expected to generate annual surpluses of income (including interest ) over expenditures.
Thereafter, the excess of projected outgo over income will require the redemption of the
trust fund’s government bonds.  Trust fund holdings of these bonds will decline rapidly
after 2018 and are expected to be exhausted by the year 2029 (see figure 1).  However,
these numbers tell only part of the story:  The trust fund’s finances are intimately related
to those of the rest of the government, and analyzing them independently can create an
unwarranted illusion of security.
The key feature that irrevocably links the Social Security trust fund to the
government’s general budget is the statutory requirement that any surplus be invested in
                                                                                                                                                                    
self-employed in 1954, and to employees of uniformed services in 1956. Benefits were increased in 1950
and again in 1972.  In 1975, they were indexed to keep pace with inflation.
6See Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Sabelhaus, “Understanding the Postwar Decline in US National Saving: A
Cohort Analysis,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1996. In addition, the Social Security
benefit payments in the form of regular monthly checks until death (rather than in the form of a lump-sum
distributions at retirement) provides insurance against lifespan uncertainty.  Although access to annuitized
resources improves retirees’ welfare by enabling them to consume at a faster rate out of their resources,
such annuitization may also constitute a reason for the decline in US saving. Recent research suggests that
the growth of entitlement and pension programs has increased to share of annuitized resources of the
elderly from under 20 percent in the early 1960s to just under 50 percent in the late 1980s. See Alan
Auerbach and others (1995).9
Treasury securities.
7  The requirement that trust fund surpluses be invested in government
bonds makes these funds available for current government expenditure.  Hence, almost all
current contributions are consumed, either by retirees or by the government.
 8  Indeed, this
implies that most worker contributions  to date have been consumed rather than invested in
real assets (real capital in the form of plants, equipment, and structures).
9  Therefore,
almost all contributions represent an investment not in tangible income generating assets,
but in the willingness and ability of future workers to contribute to the system.  In other
words, the Social Security trust fund is merely an accounting device that creates the
illusion of a “funded” system, whereas in reality it is completely “unfunded.”   As a
consequence, judgment about the long-term solvency of the system should be based on
when income from payroll contributions plus taxation of benefits begins to exceed the
outgo, and not on the reported magnitude of accumulated trust fund surpluses.
According to the official projections, outgo exceeds the sum of payroll
contributions and revenue from benefit taxation -- and , hence, the cost of honoring benefit
                                                       
7Income includes income from payroll contributions, taxation of benefits, payments from the general fund
of the Treasury and interest earnings; outgo includes benefit payments, administrative expenses and
payments to the Railroad Retirement system. These are the Social Security Administration’s calendar year
projections based upon intermediate economic and demographic assumptions.
8 Most of current payroll tax revenue is directly handed over to current retirees and is therefore directly
consumed by beneficiaries. In 1995, for example, out of total revenue of $400 b., $333 b. (83 percent) was
paid out as OASDI benefits.
9Only a very small fraction of trust fund assets may be viewed as having been invested via government
spending-- a fraction that is difficult to estimate precisely.  At one extreme, all of government spending
may be called investment since government operations enable the private economy to function efficiently.
On the other hand, all of government spending may be called consumption because it does not result in
income generating assets for the government.  In any event, the essential issue is whether, at the margin,
the return to government spending in terms of expanding the wage-tax base is higher or lower than the
return to investment in private capital.  Again the evidence appears to be ambiguous, but some recent
studies suggest that, with the possible exception of spending on education, government investment
expenditures do not add to private productivity.  (See, Evans and Karras [1994] and Holtz-Eakin [1994].
See Lansing [1995] for an overview.)
10In other words, the Social Security trust fund is merely an accounting device that creates the illusion of a
“funded” system, whereas in reality it is completely “unfunded.”10
obligations  spills over to other tax revenue sources  -- in the year 2012.  Because the first
wave of baby-boomers will begin to retire in the year 2008, the inevitable conclusion is
that the current system is incapable of meeting its benefit obligations to these generations.
D.  Private vs. Public Rates of Return
Related to the solvency issue is the fact that, given the anticipated decline in the
share of working-age individuals relative to retirees -- and recognizing that the effects of
this decline are not likely to be offset by an acceleration in wage growth -- the return that
future retirees can expect to realize from Social Security is significantly lower than what
could be earned from private pension contributions.
As can be seen in figure 2, the inflation-adjusted rate of return for future
beneficiaries of the system are projected to fall well below 2 percent, which is much lower
than, say, the rate of return on long-term government securities.
11  In fact, the outlook is
even worse than that implied by figure 2, which calculates expected returns on the basis of
gross benefits.   As  discussed in the previous section , the need to reduce benefits or
increase contributions will drive the net return to Social Security even lower, possibly
even negative.  Simply put, the existing public PAYGO pension system is a bad deal for
both current and future workers.
E. Options for the Future
In the future, a policy of imposing sizable benefit cuts is likely to come up against
several hurdles.  First, benefit reductions will become increasingly difficult as the number
and political power  of retirees and near-retirees  grows progressively larger relative to the
rest of the population.  Second, although Congress has the authority to change Social
                                                       
11  Figure 2 is taken from Gokhale and Lansing (1996).  See that article for further details.11
Security’s tax and benefit rules, the system has so far encouraged the sentiment that
retirees have  earned their rights to benefits by virtue of their past contributions.  Hence,
although small benefit reductions may be feasible,  significant benefit reductions will be
perceived as an unfair abrogation of those rights. In the wors t case, the effects of major
benefit reductions could be similar to those of repudiating (explicit) government debt--a
loss of confidence in public policies and a reduced ability of the government to engage in
future borrowing.  Third, substantial benefit cuts  may jeopardize the living standards of a
sizable fraction of those already retired or close to retirement--those with little time or
ability left for amassing adequate retirement savings in the absence of Social Security
benefits.
Other proposals for reducing benefits incl ude accelerating and extending the
scheduled increase in normal retirement ages after the year 2000 or altering the inflation-
indexing formula benefits payments.  We perceive these “solutions” as no less problematic
than explicit reductions.  Postponing retirement may involve economic hardship for some
individuals if an extended lifespan does not coincide with an extended ability to work or to
find gainful employment at older ages.  Changing cost-of-living adjustments represents  a
marginal fix that will push the date of financial insolvency further into the future by only a
few years.  In either case, these proposals are thinly disguised benefit cuts at best, and
subject to all of the criticisms against explicit cuts noted above.
The option of increasing contribution rates to meet benefit obligations also poses
problems:  According, to the official projections, a 2.19 percent increase in the
contribution rate will restore Social Security’s long-term solvency.
12  Such an increase ,
                                                       
12 See the 1996 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the OASDI program, pp. 133.12
however, will further exacerbate the on-going inter- and intragenerational redistribution of
resources that produce bad saving outcomes and  create disincentives to work .  In
addition, this approach  preserves the system’s structural deficiencies that result in most of
current contributions being consumed rather than  invested in tangible physical capital
assets.
III. The Proposal
The basic point of the foregoing discussion is that the current structure of Social
Security has several shortcomings: It detracts from incentives to work, contributes to
declining national saving, and represents a bad deal for young workers.     The current
system is not sustainable, and the usual remedies of cutting benefits or increasing payroll
taxes will only serve to worsen the economic position of all generations -- current retirees
and pre-retirees, as well as young and future generations.
The question, therefore, is whether there exists an economically and politically
viable solution that avoids the shortcomings of the current system .  Economic viability
requires that the program be sustainable.  Political viability implies that the system be
acceptable to current (and future) participants.  Any reform that would leave all
participants at least as well off under the new program as under the current one would
satisfy this condition.
Does such an alternative exist?  Our analysis suggests that it does.  In the rest of
this article, we outline a reform proposal for privatizing the system by shifting future and
some current young generations into a defined contribution plan for retirement saving.
The reform we suggest applies only to  future generations and current generations   below a
specified cut-off age . All current participants above the cut-off age are retained under the13
existing system.  Their benefits are financed by the payroll contributions of  all current and
future workers who are shifted to the privatized system . Despite the diversion of a part of
their payroll contributions toward meeting  benefit obligations to older generations, the
enhanced returns available from investments in private capital markets allow the retirement
resources of young and future generations to be preserved or increased, on average.
This plan satisfies both  the economic viability and political feasibility conditions by
adhering to the “no harm, no foul” principle: Because it preserves or improves the
retirement resources of young and future generations, it is economically sustainable.
Because it guarantees the retirement benefits of current retirees and those close to
retirement, it satisfies the political-feasibility condition.
A. A Brief Case for the Political Feasibility of  Privatization
 Why would privatization be viewed as an attractive alternative fo r at least some
current participants?  Many of the benefits of privatization that we have discussed are
primarily macroeconomic in nature.  Although it may be clear how the economy as a
whole might benefit, it may be less clear how any given individual might benefit, and hence
how the political critical mass would develop to  support a transformation of the  current
system into a privatized one .  It needs be shown, then, that such a reform is indeed likely
to provide better retirement resources to younger generations than can be provided under
the existing regime, even after accounting for the taxation required to honor the benefit
obligations to older workers and retirees.
As suggested above, the case is supported by a comparison of the rates of return
obtainable in PAYGO systems versus those obtainable in defined contribution or “funded”
systems.  In the former, because each period’s benefits are directly paid out of that14
period’s contributions, the rate of return on contributions  is ultimately tied to  the  growth
rate of labor compensation.  Real compensation approximately equals the sum of the rates
of growth of labor productivity and the size of the working population.  The growth rate
of labor productivity averaged about 2.9 percent during 1950-69, but only 1.3 percent in
the 25 years since.
13  Unfortunately, perhaps because of lower saving and investment in
the 1970s and 1980s, real compensation has fallen even more sharply , averaging only 0.75
percent during 1970-94 compared to 3.2 percent in the 1950-69 period.
In contrast to the feasible rate of return in a PAYGO system, we estimate that the
after tax rate of return on private sector (for-profit) capital assets averaged 8.2 percent
since 1970.
14  Exploiting this disparity in the rates of return available from a PAYGO
retirement scheme versus one based on investment in private capital is the basis of most
reform proposals , including those contained in the recently released  Report of the 1994-
1996 Advisory Council on Social Security  (henceforth  referred to as “the ACSS
report”).
15  The novel insight provided by our calculations is that high private rates of
return provide sufficient scope for a privatization plan that leaves all parties at least as well
off as they would be under the status quo.
                                                       
13 These figures are based on the Economic Report of the President, 1995.
14 The geometric mean rate of return was 8.1 percent.  For each of the years 1970-1993, we calculate the
after tax rate of return on private sector (for-profit) capital by solving for r in the economy wide asset
accumulation equation , At = At-1(1+r) + Yt - Ct - Tt.  Here, At stands for the  capital stock in period t
(excluding non-profit organizations), Y t includes aggregate labor income, private and government
employee pension benefits, veterans benefits, workers compensation, and government purchases, C t
represents aggregate personal consumption expenditures, and T t stands for aggregate tax payments net of
transfers.  The data for A t was taken from the Balance Sheets for the U.S. Economy--1945-94 published
by the Federal Reserve System, and data for the rest of the variables is that reported in the National
Income and Product Accounts published in the Survey of Current Business, Bureau of Labour Statistics,
various issues.
15  The report is available on the Internet at  http://www.ssa.gov/policy/adcouncil/toc.htm.15
Before proceeding, we emphasize that by privatization, we mean mandated
contributions to approved private saving plans.  Examples of such plans are the standard
401k plans.  The essential element of such plans is that they are of the defined contribution
type.  Returns are stochastic and  are tied to claims on private capital.  It should be noted
that our proposal does not permit the government to directly participate in private asset
markets on behalf of  participants. In particular, our proposal does not involve (and neither
do we recommend) that the trust fund’s Treasury securities be replaced by a portfolio of
private stocks to be managed by the government , as is contemplated, for instance,  under
option 1 of the ACSS report .  Such a swap of government obligations for private stocks
would, in our opinion,  perversely affect  the incentives facing the government and private
agents. In particular, it may provide the government with the incentive and the leverage to
pursue industrial policy or otherwise try to influence private resource allocations.  Such
ancillary agendas would likely undermine confidence in the plan and inhibit acceptance of
transiting to a privatized system even in light of the superior returns than can be delivered
relative to the current PAYGO scheme.
B. The Mechanics of the Proposal
16
The “no harm, no foul” principle prescribes two conditions that must be satisfied in
migrating to a private system.  First, as noted, our rule requires that benefit obligations to
retirees and those close to retirement who are retained under the current system (those
above the cut-off age) must be met under the new plan.  A  portion of these obligations can
be financed from the contributions of pre-retirees themselves.  The remainder must be met
out of the contributions of  workers who participate in the  new privatized  system.
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However, the second condition  of the “no harm, no foul” principle  is that the present value
of returns in the privatized plan (net of the amount devoted to paying older generations’
benefits) must  at least equal the present value of benefits that they would receive under the
current public social security  system. The central issue to be resolved in our proposal is
how to determine an appropriate cut-off age below which workers are shifted to the
privatized plan, and above which all  participants  who remain  in the existing unfunded
system receive the same benefits they could anticipate without the reform.
As noted, a key to the feasibility of our reform proposal is the fact that the  rate of
return in the privatized system will exceed that under the current PAYGO system.
However, if the  chosen cut-off age is too high, some workers would not have enough
remaining years to exploit the increased private returns, leaving them worse off than
before.  A lower cut-off age provides younger generations with more time to accumulate
plan contributions at the higher private rate of return.  However, this must be traded-off
against the fact that the liabilities to those remaining under the current system (which
increase as the cut-off age is lowered) must be partly financed out of the contributions of
those who are shifted to the new plan (whose numbers decrease as the cut-off age is
lowered).  Choosing the appropriate cut-off age and the fraction of young workers’
contributions to be devoted to paying off the liabilities to older generations requires
balancing these concerns.
Calculations using the current distributions of Social Security benefits by age and
sex suggest that 32 is the appropriate cut-off age.
17  With this dividing line, about 54
                                                       
17  These calculations assume a 1.2 percent rate of growth in future benefits per capita, a 6 percent
discount rate for calculating the present value of future benefits, and an 8 percent return on private capital.
Future Social Security  benefits are discounted at a 6% rate to capture the uncertainty associated with17
percent of young workers’ contributions would be adequate to provide older generations
with benefits at least equal to those received under the current system. Furthermore, given
our assumptions , future retirement resources  for workers younger than age 32 would be
greater than those offered by the current system because their contributions will reap the
higher private rate of return.
Our estimated cut-off age and share of contribution dedicated to financing existing
benefits do, of course, depend on our specific assumptions . Those assumptions  include
the appropriate discount rate applied to Social Security benefits and the return to private
capital.  Table 1 provides information on how these estimates change given different
choices for these values.  In particular, the table shows that assuming lower average rates
of return on private capital do not alter the results substantially.  For example, with a 6
percent rate of return on private capital and the same rate of discount on benefit payments,
the cut-off age falls to 26 and the fraction of young workers contributions that must be
devoted to paying older generations’ benefits becomes 51 percent.
18 We emphasize that
our essential message at this point is not so much that a particular cut-off age or
“contribution tax” is the right one but that, given sensible parameters, the type of reform
that we propose is feasible.
C.  Debt, Taxes, and the Transition to Privatization
                                                                                                                                                                    
future transfers. Details on these calculations are provided in an appendix  to the working paper version of
this article, which is available on  Federal Reserve  Bank of Cleveland’s  home page at
http://www.clev.frb.org .
18   Note from table 1 that the relationship between cut-off ages and the fraction of privatized contributions
required to finance existing  obligations is not monotonic in assumed rates of return.  The lack of a simple
relationship appears to be a general property of the generational accounting exercise that involves present
values of earning, tax, and benefit flows, which in turn depend upon demographics, age-earning profiles,
etc.18
When discussing Social Security privatization, some economists have expressed
concern about the costs of transition from the current to a new, privatized system.
19
Under some proposals such a transition involves sizable increases in fiscal deficits and debt
for financing the benefit payments to older generations, which means that the economic
impact of privatization depends crucially on how the additional debt is serviced.  For
example, using higher income taxes to service the debt may harm saving incentives
because of the additional taxation of capital income arising from an income tax hike.  The
lower saving and investment may, at least temporarily, lead to slower economic growth.  
In contrast, the proposal outlined in this paper does not involve any taxation over
and above the current rate payroll contributions.  Because our plan calls for paying full
benefits under current law to older generations, but devoting only a part of current young
workers’ contributions toward this end, the gap between benefit payouts and revenue
earmarked for this purpose must be met by the creation of additional public debt.  Debt
creation on this account  is temporary.    Additions to the stock of debt will cease when
benefit payments to old generations becomes less than the revenue generated for this
purpose.  Thereafter, the share of future generations’ payroll contributions that is devoted
to “paying off” benefit liabilities  would be devoted to servicing th e debt created along the
transition path to the fully privatized system .
It is important to emphasize that  debt creation associated with privatization
imposes no additional liability to current and future generations in totality.  The role of
debt in the plan is to implement an equal (growth-adjusted) distribution of the burden of
                                                       
19  See, for instance, Kotlikoff (1996) or Mitchell and Zeldes (1996).19
benefit payments to current older generations that remain in the existing system.  Diverting
an equal (flat) proportion of young and future generations’ wages to pay current retiree
benefits or to service the debt created by doing so makes possible an intergenerational
sharing of costs for honoring promises to those who remain  under the current Social
Security program.        
IV.  Truth in Advertising: Some Caveats and Complications
A.  General Equilibrium Effects
The calculations used to support our proposal are partial equilibrium in nature.
That is, they do not take into account feedback from changes in the macroeconomy that
would result from implementation of the privatization scheme that we advocate.  For,
example, the fact that today the rate of return on capital is greater than the growth rate of
the economy suggests that the US economy is under-capitalized.
21 Over time, privatization
may be expected to increase saving and investment, thereby increasing the capital-labor
ratio.  This would reduce the rate of return on capital and increase the rate of labor
compensation.   All else equal, a decline in the return to capital will tend to offset some of
the higher returns to the privatized system.  On the other hand, all else will not be equal .
The closer linkage between contributions and benefits inherent in a defined contribution
plan is likely to improve incentives to work, increase labor-force participation, and
dampen the increase in the capital-labor ratio due to capital deepening under privatization.
Moreover, the better work incentives and added saving and investment will likely imply
                                                                                                                                                                    
20 The creation of additional debt on this account will cease when benefit payments to old generations
becomes less than the revenue generated for this purpose.  This will occur  before all old generations
included under the existing system have passed away.
21 Economies in which this is the case are said to be “dynamically efficient.”  For evidence that this is
indeed the case for the U.S. economy, see Abel, et. al. (1989).20
that the fraction of young and future workers’ contributions required for financing older
generations benefits will be lower than 54 percent.
A fully satisfactory examination of the proposal would  require formal analysis in a
general equilibrium context.  We note, however, that the results reported in table 1 can be
used to provide some sense of whether general equilibrium effects would overturn the
feasibility of our privatization scheme.  For example, in his recent work on social security
privatization Kotlikoff (1996) employs a model that implies  a pre-reform annual post-tax
rate of return to capital of about 8 percent, identical to the assumed rate of return in our
benchmark calculations.  In his analysis, a “cold-turkey” privatization that maintains some
“no harm, no foul” provisions would cause the return to fall by about 16 percent.  As seen
in table 1, a change of such magnitude -- which is quite large -- would still leave us  within
the feasibility range for our proposal.
B.  Multiple Objectives of the Social Security System
We have adopted the position that, at i ts core, social security is a pension system.
This is an admittedly restrictive view, as the system in the United States also plays a role in
redistributing income within given age groups and providing public insurance against
macroeconomic shocks across generations.
22  We treat these goals as separate from the
central purpose of the social security, and assume that, to the extent they are desirable,
these needs can be met through alternative fiscal programs.  Doing so may, of course,
entail additional taxation and expenditure policies , with corresponding  effects that we have
not factored into the analysis.  It is our position, however, that these should be treated as
                                                       
22  Because benefit payments do not rise proportionately with contributions, the system implicitly contains
an element of  progressive taxation.  In addition, benefits for wealthier recipients are taxed explicitly.21
distinct from the pension issue at the center of the social security system, as both an
intellectual and practical matter.
23
C.  Risk
One potential drawback of the type of privatized plan we describe is that a defined
contribution scheme shifts market risk to contributors, thus mitigating its attractiveness.
We respond to this argument in three ways.  First, the issue of increased risk will arise to
some degree in any reform scheme that has a defined contribution element, which is to say
most of them.  Second, given the history of Social Security legislation and the
questionable viability of the current system, benefits under the status quo are far from
certain.  Third, the magnitude of the spread between implied returns for current workers
under Social Security and those available from investments in private capital over long
horizons is sufficiently large to compensate for the greater uncertainty of the latter, even
for quite large degrees of risk aversion.
24
D. Implications for the Rest of the Government’s Budget
Because our plan redirects all future contributions into private investments via
private defined contribution  plans, there remains the issue of how the government will
finance that part of current spending paid for by the trust fund’s annual surpluses.  In this
context, it is important to note that the trust fund concept -- if its obligations are honored -
- amounts to nothing more than  issuing government bonds, placing them in the trust fund ,
                                                       
23 We use OASDI taxes and benefits to calculate our results.  Hence, under our proposal, disability and
survivor benefits would be paid to older generations as under the existing system.  Young generations
shifted to the new plan would be required to finance these payments out of their privatized OASDI
portfolios.
24  Technically, for a standard type of “utility function” and the empirical distribution of rates of return to
capital averaged over periods of, say, ten years, the expected utility of one dollar of investment in private
capital exceeds the utility of a certain 2 percent return from Social Security, even for utility
parameterizations that imply significant risk aversion.22
and promising to increase taxes in the future.  We view this as independent of the public
pension system per se, and believe that the non-pension aspects of fiscal policy should , in
practice, be separated from the Social Security program, be it public or private in nature.
Our preference would be to respond to the elimination of temporary Social Security
surpluses by reductions in spending :  We believe that there  is value in an approach to
reform that directly  and exclusively addresses the need to  provide retirement security
without commingling  the system designed for this purpose  with other fiscal programs.
Nevertheless, the reality of the current situation forces consideration of how  public
spending  currently being financed by Social Security’ s annual surpluses would be paid for
under our proposal .  We evaluate the impact of adding th is spending to  the liabilities to old
generations  in the privatized system proposed here .  Doing so reduce s the cut-off age to
34 and increases the fraction  of payroll revenues  devoted to paying off liabilities  to 60
percent under our b enchmark  assumptions.   Table 3 show the results  based on other
discount rate combinations .
25  Thus, factoring into our calculations  the cost of government
spending  that is now being  financed by annual  Social Security  surpluses does  not eliminate
the economic and political feasibility  of our plan.
E.  Administrative Costs
Some concern has been raised about the potential administrative costs of a
privatized system, which by most accounts would exceed those of the current public
system.  Skepticism on this account has been  fueled in particular  by the relatively high
                                                       
25 The value of government spending financed by annual Social Security surpluses was calculated by
subtracting projected annual benefit payments plus administrative costs  from the sum of payroll tax
contributions and revenue from taxation of benefits.   This calculation produces  positive numbers  through
the year 2012.  The numbers were taken from the Annual Report of the  Trustees of the Social Security
Administration, 1996.23
costs realized under the privatized plan implemented by Chile, which is often held out as a
possible model for U.S. reform (see, for instance, Diamond [ 1993]).  Because
administrative costs will reduce the effective rate of return on private investment
portfolios, this issue is an important one.
Ultimately, the administrative costs of a privatized system will dep end on the exact
nature of the plan, including whether benefits are annuitized or paid out in lump-sums, the
number and type of assets that individual savers have access to, and  how much flexibility
investors have in choosing among the av ailable options.  However,  a sense of the probable
magnitude of  administrative costs in the type of system we have described can be gleaned
from a recent comprehensive study by Mitchell (1996) , who examines the typical costs of
a variety of  managed  retirement saving vehicles .
On one extreme, Mitchell finds that  representative  401k plans --  which have
significant flexibility in payout and contribution options, among other features --  involve
expenses that range from 0.84 to 1.88 percent of total assets.
26  At the other end of the
spectrum, the costs of administering a simple  stock index fund  are in the area of  only
about 0.3 percent of assets.   The College Retirement Equity Fund  (CREF), an existing
plan that has a large asset base and which  falls in between the  other two alternatives with
respect to flexibility and number of investment options , has expense ratios in the
neighborhood of the simple index funds.
In fact, we think of the  CREF structure as a reasonable model for the type of
privatized  plan we are espousing .  Nonetheless,  as the calculations in tables 1-3 indicate,
                                                       
26  The expense ratios reported by Mitchell do not include commissions , or “loads.”24
our plan would remain viable  even at the relatively high expense ratios associated with
existing 401k  plans.   
 V. Conclusion
The plan described here suggests that it is indeed possible to restructure Social
Security in a way that is economically viable and politically feasible:  To place it on a
secure and sustainable economic foundation for the long-term while simultaneously
honoring benefit obligations to current retirees and pre-retirees.   Importantly , the
calculations we provide  suggest that the most ambitious of privatized schemes, such as
option 3 of the ACSS report, can be implemented without reducing benefits or increasing
payroll taxes.   Our specific  numbers  may, of course, be susceptible to additional
refinement.  However, the basic argument provides a sensible framework for addressing
one of the most important fiscal challenge facing the nation in the next few decades.
Privatizing Social Security will, apart from rendering the system sustainable will
confer other benefits.  Current tax and benefit rules generate a redistribution of resources
both within and across generations, weakening the link between contributions and
benefits.  Further, the current system results in the consumption rather than investment of
worker contributions in real capital assets.  Hence, the current system harms work
incentives and reduces national saving.  A transition to a privatized system would restore
the link between contributions and benefits and would gradually reduce the on-going
redistribution of resources from young and unborn generations to older ones.  It would
thereby improving work effort, saving, and ultimately national output.
As a final point, we emphasize again that the window of opportunity for exploiting
the benefits of a plan like the one we have proposed is relatively narrow.  Table 225
illustrates, for different years of implementation, the implied cut-off ages and share of
contributions that must be used to finance the benefits of those who are not shifted to the
private plan.  As shown, deferring implementation reduces the former and increases the
latter.  Based on our assumptions, our plan would be economically infeasible if not
implemented before 2011.  Given the rapid rise in the “contribution tax” necessary to
honor the obligations to those who remain under the current system, political infeasibility
may result well before that date. The type of social security privatization described here
has several favorable features when compared to others, and is likely to hold up for a
variety of alternative assumptions about the economic environment.  Given that the
window of opportunity is in fact narrow, we believe that our framework deserves careful
consideration in current debates on social security reform.26
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Table 1:  Some Sensitivity Analysis






of Return 5% 6% 7% 8%
6% 26 26 26 27
7% 30 29 29 30
8% 33 32 32 32
9% 35 34 34 34
10% 37 36 36 36






of Return 5% 6% 7% 8%
6% 49.1 50.7 50.1 49.8
7% 49.9 52.5 53.3 54.0
8% 49.8 53.5 55.4 56.0
9% 49.5 53.8 56.2 57.4
10% 48.8 53.6 56.5 58.3
Note:  Shaded boxes represent benchmark case.29
Table 2:  The “Window of Opportunity”
Year of Reform






2012 Not Feasible Not Feasible
Note:  Calculations assume an 8 percent annual return to private capital and a 6 percent
rate of discount applied to Social Security benefits.30
Table 3:  The Plan With Rplacement of
Surplus-Financed Government Expenditures






of Return 5% 6% 7% 8%
6% 23 23 33 24
7% 28 27 27 27
8% 31 30 30 29
9% 34 33 32 32
10% 36 35 34 34






of Return 5% 6% 7% 8%
6% 54.4 56.9 57.0 57.1
7% 55.2 58.8 60.5 60.8
8% 55.0 59.6 62.1 62.7
9% 54.3 59.6 62.7 64.5
10% 53.5 59.3 62.9 65.2
Note:  Shaded boxes represent benchmark case.31
Appendix
This appendix describes the calculation of the two unknown quantities: 1) the
appropriate cut-off age,  s,  and 2) the fraction,  d, of payroll taxes of young workers to be
devoted to paying off the current system’s liabilities to those older than the cut-off age.
The calculation of  s and d involves the simultaneous solution of two equations in these
two unknowns.  The first equation states that the present value of all future benefit
payments to old generations (those above the cut-off age) must equal the present value of
the revenues available to do so, namely, the sum of a) the payroll contributions of those
who are above the cut-off age but are still working and b) a fraction,  d, of the payroll
contributions of young and future generations.  The second equation states that members
of the generation just below the cut-off age must, on average, be just as well off by
investing (1- d) of their payroll contributions in private capital markets as they would be
under the current system.
The present value of future benefit payments to old generations is estimated as
follows.  Consider the following equation:
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(1) Bs = b
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Here, Bs stands for the aggregate value of OASDI benefits disbursed in the year s, b
m
65s
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is stand for the
populations of males and females respectively, aged i in year s.  We use values of B s for
the years 1993 through 2070 from the Social Security Administration’s (SSA’s)32
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is are based upon the
Annual Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin, 1993.  Using these  b values for all
future years, we solve equation (1) for b
m
65s for each year s=1993 through 2070.  The















is for years after 2070 are
obtained by applying a growth factor (1+g) to the corresponding values in the previous




is for future years, the present value of benefits to be
paid to those older than age  s in the base year t is given by
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In equation (2), B
o
s stands for the total benefits paid to old generations (those aged  s or
older in year t) in a future year s, up to age 100.  These benefits are discounted to the
present at the discount factor R b=1/(1+rb), where rb is the discount rate applied to future
Social Security benefits.  We use the value of 0.06 for r b in our base case calculations, to
reflect the riskiness of future Social Security benefits.
As mentioned earlier, the present value of taxes for paying off the system’s
liabilities to old generations is composed of two parts: The present value of taxes paid by
those aged s or more but who are still working in period t is calculated in a similar
manner:
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In equation (3) C s stands for the aggregate payroll contributions made in year s, c
m
40s




















65s.  For the values of C s, we use SSA’s intermediate





is are based on Current Population Survey’s March 1993 files.  The values of c
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40s
for each year s through 2070 are obtained by solving equation (3).  Next, the values of















is for years after 2070 are
obtained by applying a growth factor (1+g) to the corresponding values in the previous
year.  Then, the present value of the contributions of old generations above the cut-off age
s in year t can be specified as
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Because the present value of benefits to be paid to those aged  s or older in year t
[the left-hand-side of equation (2)] exceeds the present value of these generations own
payroll contributions [the left-hand-side of equation (4)], an additional contribution must
be made by generations younger than age  s in year t. This amount is given by the equation
   ¥                                    ¥                 min[100,( s-1+s-t)]
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Having evaluated its components, the first of the two simultaneous equation mentioned at
the beginning can be written as:34
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The second equation specifies that, on average, accumulated resources available to
members of the generation aged  s-1 in their year of retirement (assumed to be the year in
which the become 65 years old) must be as large as the value of OASDI benefits promised
them under the current Social Security system, evaluated as of the same year.  These two
values may be equated as
         t+65-(s-1)                                             t+65-( s-1)                                          t+100-( s-1)
(7) (1-d)    S     c
x
(s-1+s-t),s/Rc
(s-t)  =     S    b
x
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Here, x stands for male or female and c is and bis are calculated as before.  Note that the
present value of contributions is computed using the private capital market discount factor
Rc=1/(1+rc).  In our base case calculations, we use the value of r c=0.08.  The value of
benefits has two parts.  The first term on the left hand side represents the (survivor and
disability) benefits received prior to age 65, accumulated up to age 65. The second term
on the right hand side represents the value of (old age and other) benefits received after
age 65, discounted back to age 65.  These two components are calculated using the
discount factor R b.
Equations (6) and (7) must be solved simultaneously to determine  s and d.  We
first determine the value of  d that will solve equation (6) for each age  s=18...65.  Then,
again for each age  s=18...65, we use the corresponding  d to compute the left-hand-side of
equation (7) and check if it exceeds the right-hand-side.  The cut-off age,  s
*, is determined35
such that the left-hand-side of equation (7) exceeds the right-hand-side for both male and
female generations aged  s
*, but not for those aged  s
*+ 1.